

# Stable Matchings as a Distributed Problem

COSC 373  
Spring 2022

# Overview


1. Stable Matchings + Gale Shapley Algorithm
2. SMP in the Distributed Setting
3. The Post-Ordering Model

# Last Time


Stable matchings (Stable marriage problem, SMP)

1. Set  $S$  of students } "agents"
2. Set  $U$  of internships }  $1 - 1$  matching  
between students + internships
3. Preference list for each agent  
· ranked list of acceptable partners

Not Stable



Stable



F

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	1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4
Anna :	a	b	c		(a)	A	C	B	
Beck :	c	b	a		b	A		B	D
Cameron :	a	d	c		(c)	A	C	D	B
Daniel :	c	d	b	d	(d)	D	C		

## Questions

1. Do stable matchings always exist? → Yes!

2. How can we find a stable matching?

↳ algorithm: - apply to 1 internship  
@ a time

- internships  
- defer or reject

At termination deferred applicants  
form stable matching.

- No ties, "complete prefs" rank all potential  
partners

# Gale - Shapley Algorithm

## Ideas.

1. Each student applies to one internship at a time
  - can only apply to another if rejected
  - apply sequentially in decreasing order of preference
2. Each internship can defer at most one applicant at a time
  - reject all but best applicant to date

Terminology. Call a student active if

- (1) not currently matched
- (2) has not been rejected by all acceptable internships

### Gale Shapley Algorithm

While some student is active


1. All active students apply to next most favored internship
2. Each internship defers best app so far, rejects others

Return set of deferred pairs

Theorem. (GS, 1962). On all inputs, the GS algorithm terminates and returns a stable matching.

### Example.

Students				Internships			
1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
a	b	c		A			
				a : [A]	X	B	
X	b	a		B			
X				b : A	B	D	
X	d	c		C			
				c : A	C	D	X
c	d	b		D			
				d : D	C		



Pareto optimality

## Analysis of Gale-Shapley Algorithm.

Terminology. Call a single iteration of the while-loop a round.

Observations :

- O1 students apply to internships sequentially in decreasing order of preference

• O2 If student  $s$  applies to  $u$  in round  $r$ ,  $s$  was rejected by all preferred internships in previous rounds

- O3 If internship  $u$  is matched in round  $r$ , then  $u$  remains matched in all subseq. rounds

- O4. If  $u$  rejects  $s$  in round  $r$ , then  $u$  prefers its match to  $s$  in all subsequent rounds.

## Gale Shapley Algorithm

While some student is active

1. All active students apply to next most favored internship
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Return set of deferred pairs

CONSEQUENCE OF 2

Termination. Suppose  $S = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n\}$  and  $s_i$  has  $m_i$  acceptable partners. Then the GS algorithm terminates after at most  $m = m_1 + m_2 + \dots + m_n = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i$  rounds.

Proof.

Note: if someone is active in round  $r$ , they were rejected in round  $r-1$   $\rightarrow$  each round w/ no termination witnesses a rejection.

How many rejections can  $s_i$  get (total)?  $\leq m_i$

Total rejections before termination:  $m_1 + m_2 + m_3 + \dots + m_n$

$$n + n - 1 + \dots + 1$$

$$\begin{array}{|c|} \hline m_i = n \\ \hline \end{array} \quad \downarrow \quad m = n^2$$

Stability. Suppose  $M$  is the matching of deferred applicants. Then  $M$  is a stable matching.

Proof. Consider pair  $(s, u)$  that are not matched w/ each other in  $M$

- if  $s$  doesn't prefer  $u$  to partner in  $M$ , then not blocking
  - if  $s$  does prefer  $u$ , then  $s$  applied to  $u$  and was rejected (or)
  - then  $u$  prefers match to

Can this bound be achieved?  $\begin{cases} (s, u) & \text{so} \\ \text{not} & \text{blocking} \\ (\text{off}) & \end{cases}$

## Interlude. Why start w/ stable matchings?

- Algorithmic problem that has nothing to do w/ computers
- math problem w/ out numbers
- economic problem w/ out money
- applications
  - matching medical residents to hospitals
  - kidney exchange
- academic significance
  - GS paper has 6,000+ citations
  - 2012 Nobel prize in economics  
to Shapley + Roth for work on SM
- endless variations

## Personal history:

- subject of my PhD dissertation
- entry to distributed computing
- started from offhand comment

Finally. Stable matching problem  
is naturally a  
distributed problem

# Stable Matchings as a Distributed Problem

## Distributed Features

1. Each agent (student or internship) has own local input (pref. list)
  - preferences are only initially known to self
2. finding solution requires coordination and communication
3. Communication is (naturally) restricted
  - only communicate w/ acceptable partners
  - locality

## Questions

1. How could we implement GS in practice in decentralized manner?

- communication via email

2. What complications / subtleties arise in the decentralized implementation?

## Gale Shapley Algorithm

While some student is active

- 1. All active students apply to next most favored internship
- 2. Each internship defers best app so far, rejects others

Return set of deferred pairs


→ Scheduling + synchronization

- broadcast all-to-all comm?
- 

→ detecting termination

## Complicating Factors

### 1. Synchrony vs asynchrony



### 2. Termination detection

How do we know when computation is complete?

# Port-Ordering (PO) Model

## Network

Modeled as a graph  $G = (V, E)$

- $V$  = set of nodes a.k.a. vertices
- $E$  = set of edges
  - each edge is a pair of nodes
  - edges = connections between nodes

Variation nodes may have distinct roles

- e.g. students + internships

Terminology vertices  $u, v \in V$  are neighbors


if  $(u, v)$  is an edge in  $E$

- $u$  and  $v$  are incident to  $(u, v)$

The degree of  $v$ , denoted  $\deg(v)$  is

$$\begin{aligned}\deg(v) &= \# \text{ of neighbors of } v \\ &= \# \text{ incident edges}\end{aligned}$$

Students



internships

## Port - Ordering

Each vertex  $v$  has an ordering of its neighbors:  $1, 2, 3, \dots, \deg(v)$

Crucial Vertices do not have "unique identifiers"


- "anonymous network"
- nodes distinguish neighbors only by port number

Note: Stable matching instances  $\Rightarrow$  PO Networks

students  $\rightsquigarrow$  blue nodes  
 internships  $\rightsquigarrow$  red nodes } blue nodes only have red neighbors and vice versa  $\rightarrow$  graph is bipartite

preferences  $\rightsquigarrow$  port ordering

$\rightarrow$  top ranked partner gets port 1, etc.




## SM Instance

	1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4
Anna:	a	b	c		q:	A	C	B	
Beck:	c	b	a		b:	A	B	D	
Cameron:	a	d	c		c:	A	C	D	B
Daniel:	c	d	b		d:	D	C		



PO Network



## Computation in PO model

Execution proceeds in synchronous rounds

Each round, each node does:

1. receive messages sent by neighbors in prev. rounds
2. perform local computations  
→ no restrictions on complexity
3. sends messages to neighboring nodes,  
or halts and produces output

More formally a

- Each node has initial state  $S$  consisting of local input and ports
- throughout execution, updates state to include contents of received messages each round
- sent messages in round  $i$  determined by state in round  $i$  (or choice to halt)

} A PO protocol is a specification of messages/halt from states

## Gale Shapley as a PO protocol

### Procedure for students:

Initialize:

cur = 1

each round i, do

| if  $i = 1$ , send "apply" to cur

| if received "reject" from cur in round  $i-1$

| | if cur = my degree, return ⊥ and halt

| | else, Cur  $\leftarrow$  cur + 1, send "apply" to cur

return cur and halt

## Does this work?

### Procedure for internships

Initialize:

cur = 00

each round i, do

| set reject  $\leftarrow \emptyset$

| for each j from which received  
"apply" in round  $i-1$

| | if  $j < cur$

| | | add cur to reject

| | | set cur  $\leftarrow j$

| else

| | add j to reject

for each j in reject

| send "reject" to j

return cur

Issue with Gale Shapley in PO model:

## TERMINATION

When is the procedure complete?

Previously: if there are  $m$  total acceptable partners (i.e. edges in graph), then GS returns after  $\leq m$  iterations.

- Note  $m$  iterations of GS  
=  $2m$  rounds of PO model

Could we just detect when  $2m$  rounds have elapsed and halt/return then?

## Gale Shapley Algorithm

While some student is active

1. All active students apply to next most favored internship
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Return set of deferred pairs

## Coming Up

- if we do not give nodes some "global" information  
w/ initial state solving SMP in PO model is impossible
- if graph has diameter  $D$ , no distributed algorithm can solve  
SMP in fewer than  $D-1$  rounds
- if nodes have unique IDs, then SMP can be solved  
w/ out additional "global" information, and termination  
can be detected after  $\Theta(D)$  rounds
- the simpler problem of finding a "maximal matching"  
can be solved w/ only local information